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Abstract
We present a costly voting model in which each voter has a private valuation for their
preferred outcome of a vote. When there is a zero cost to voting, all voters vote and hence all
values are counted equally regardless of how high they may be. By having a cost to voting, only
those with high enough values would choose to incur this cost. We show that, by adding this
cost, welfare may be enhanced even when the cost of voting is wasteful. Such an effect occurs
when there is both a large enough density of voters with low values and the expected value of
voters is high enough.
JEL codes: C70, D72.
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1 Introduction
"The object of our deliberations is to promote the good purposes for which elections
have been instituted, and to prevent their inconveniences." (Edmund Burke as cited in
Lakeman and Lambert, 1959, p. 19)
Groups within society often have to make collective decisions. In order to reach correct social
decisions, the valuations of all those affected by the decision should be aggregated. By leaving some
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out, a group may reach an incorrect decision. For example, take a committee that must decide an
issue at a meeting. Each member has a certain private value to the results of the decision reached
by the committee. The committee’s social value of the decision is the sum of the individual private
values and, hence, aggregation is necessary to reach the correct decision. This scenario fits many
decision problems such as public good provision where aggregation is the basis of cost-benefit tests
or many of the issues that are decided by the California ballot propositions.
A common method to reach a decision is to have a majority vote.1 Since each member of the
committee has information that is relevant to the decision, we would normally think that ensuring
all participate in voting would improve the final outcome. In fact, many countries (including
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, and Greece) have compulsory voting to ensure inclusion.2 There
is, however, significant difference between aggregating all private values and using a vote while
ensuring full participation of all voters.
In social valuation, the strength of preference counts. In majority voting, the options for
expressing preference for any particular alternative are limited to either voting for it, or not voting
for it (that is, vote for an alternative or abstain).3 This means with majority voting it is not possible
to demonstrate intensity of preferences.4 One voter mildly in favor of an alternative exactly offsets
another voter who is strongly opposed. The addition of voters that do not have strong preferences
can distort election outcomes. Indeed, in Australia where voting is mandatory, “donkey votes”
(those that simply were cast by order of a ballot) give a 1% edge to those listed first (see Orr, 2002,
and King and Leigh, 2009).
Several voting mechanisms to replace simple majority voting have been proposed to ameliorate
this problem. One method is to combine the voting on several issues that are decided sequentially
by allowing voters to store votes (or use future votes) to indicate intensity (see Casella, 2005, Casella
and Gelman, 2008, Casella, Gelman, and Palfrey, 2006, Casella, 2011, Jackson and Sonnenschein,
2007, Engelmann and Grimm, 2012). One may also give voters extra votes that can be used on
1See Drexl and Klein (2013) and Gershkov et al. (2013).
2Enforcement ranges from fines (Australia) to disenfranchisement (Belgium) or making it diffi cult to obtain a
passport or driver’s license (see The Guardian, July 4, 2005).
3Among the rare exceptions are reality TV shows such as Pop Idol where individuals can vote more than once
(and pay for each vote).
4As mentioned by Mueller (2003, page 104): “Majority rule records only these ordinal preferences for each individ-
ual on the issue pair. The condition for the Pareto optimality of the supply of the public goods requires information
on the relative intensity of individual preferences."
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issues that are more important to them (see Hortala-Vallve, 2012). Vote trading can also be allowed
(see Casella, Palfrey, and Turban, 2014), or votes can be bought or sold on the open market (see
Casella, Llorente-Saguer, and Palfrey, 2012, Lalley and Weyl, 2015).5 Finally, Bognar, Börgers,
and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2015) find the optimal dynamic voting mechanism given that votes are costly.
While these variations may improve welfare, for good reason, there may be resistance to moving
away from simple majority voting for making decisions.6 In this paper, we suggest that welfare can
also improved while keeping the mechanism of majority voting by ensuring that voters who have
only mild feelings about the alternatives are excluded via costly voting.7 We do see such issues
as relevant in elections. In the UK it is common for parties to charge for voting on the choice of
party leader. In 2015, the UK Labour party lowered the cost of voting to £ 3 (∼$4) and streamlined
the process for registering. This may have helped Corbyn to victory. Ironically, in 2016, for party
leadership the cost of voting was raised to £ 25 (∼$33) with a less convenient sign-up period. Eaton
(2016) claimed that this would more likely eliminate less passionate centrists.
We can see how costly voting can shift the outcome to socially effi cient one by deterring voters
in the following example. There are two options: A and B. If one voter values option A at 20 utils
and option B at 0 and two voters value option B at 6 and option A at 0, then costless voting will
result in option B with total utility of 12. However, imposing a voting cost of 6 will deter those
preferring option B from voting. The welfare from costly voting will be 20 utils minus a cost of 6
utils (since there will be only one voter) resulting in an overall improvement. However, it is possible
that the outcome of the vote is shifted to being socially effi cient, but the cost involved in voting is
too high to improve welfare. This can happen if each voter that prefers option B has a value of 9 for
B, instead of 6. To deter voting for option B, the cost would have to be 4.5 or higher. (Each voter
either moves the outcome from a tie to win or a loss to a tie, which is worth half the value.) This
would more than offset the gain from shifting the winning option from B to A in overall surplus of
2.
Our paper determines the properties of the distribution of values (when unknown), that ensure
5 If it is known who has better information or likely to care more about an issue, then votes can be given different
weights as in Budescu and Chen (2014).
6Britian’s 2011 attempt to move from the first-past-the-post to alternative-vote was soundly defeated (see BBC
news, May 7, 2011).
7There is a widely held belief that costly voting is detrimental since it deters voting (and is a cost to those that do
vote). The fact that a cost doesn’t seem to deter everyone in practice leads to the literature explaining the paradox
of why people vote (see Dhillon and Peralta, 2002, for an overview).
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the imposition of a wasteful cost of voting will ex-ante improve welfare. We use a model with a
continuous distribution of values both when there is a fixed number of supporters for each out-
come and when there is aggregate supporter uncertainty, more specifically, where each supporter
randomly (iid) supports each outcome. We find that whether costly voting is superior to costless
voting requires that the expected value of a voter times the density of the lowest voters be larger
than one for fixed supporters (or 1/2 with aggregate supporter uncertainty). Intuitively, the density
of the lowest voters determines how many voters will be eliminated by the cost while the expected
value is the benefit due to leaving out a voter that has a low value of the outcome (increasing the
likelihood that someone with a higher value will win). We also show that a government would
never want to have mandatory voting by imposing fines or subsidizing voting but would wish to
implement a poll tax (a charge for voting) if it is politically practical. Finally, we show that for
a fixed level of equilibrium voting, the utilitarian outcome is more likely with a uniform cost of
voting than with a random cost.
Krishna and Morgan (2015) also recognize that costly voting deters those with low values more
than those with high values. In their model, majority voting with costly voting leads to the
utilitarian outcome being more likely to being chosen. Whether or not having a cost to voting is
overall beneficial is not addressed.8 Börgers (2000, 2004) asks a question in the spirit of our analysis.
Namely, whether a reduction of the costs of voting can be damaging.9 While he graphically shows
such a possibility, in his model a suffi cient reduction would always be beneficial, since while there
is uncertainty for which alternative a voter prefers, there is no difference in intensity of preference
for a particular alternative.10
Our paper also relates to the public good provision literature. Palfrey and Ledyard (1994, 1999,
8Krishna and Morgan (2011) have a version of Krishna and Morgan (2015) but with a common element (compen-
tency). With large numbers of voluntary voters, the welfare optimizing candidate is elected. We and this literature
also build upon Bulkley et al. (2001) and Osborne et al. (2000) that establish that when voting is costly the outcome
of the voting game will have an equilibrium in which only voters with high values (from the extremes) will participate.
9Krasa and Polborn (2009) vary the Börgers model by allowing for ex-ante asymmetry of preferences over alter-
natives.
10 It is possible to see how Börgers (2000) works with a simple numerical example: There are two voters, V1 and V2,
and two candidates, A and B. Each voter has a 50% chance of preferring each candidate and values their candidate
winning at 1 (and the other at 0). If the cost of V1 voting is 0.25− ε and V2 voting is 0.25− 2ε, then both will vote
and the total surplus will be 1.5 − 0.5 + 3ε. Note the expected value when both vote is the average of when they
agree, value of 2, and when they disagree, value of 1. Also, note that the expected benefit for a voter voting (given
the other voter votes) is 0.25. This is since half the the other voter agrees with a voters choice and the other half, it
moves from a loss to a tie. If costs increase such that the cost of V1 voting is 0.25+ ε and V2 voting is 0.25− ε, then
only V2 would vote yielding a surplus of 1.5 − 0.25 + ε. Of course, if voting costs drop to zero, both will vote and
surplus will be 1.5.
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2002) look at mechanisms including simple voting schemes for providing public goods. In Palfrey
and Ledyard, the voting options are to provide or not provide a public good where provision could
have a loss for those that have little value for it and have to pay for it. In this paper we have two
options each with non-negative value and voting can potentially have a cost.
While less related, the Condorcet Jury literature models voting by a group of individuals with
a common value over two alternatives (see Young, 1988). Krishna and Morgan (2012) show that as
the cost of voting goes to zero, voluntary voting is the optimal mechanism. Ghoshal and Lockwood
(2009) have combined the common value in the Condorcet Jury literature with the private value
of alternatives and comparisons in Börgers (2004). They find that if the voters put a high weight
on personal preferences then there is an ineffi ciently high voter turnout and in the case voters
care more about the common aspect then there is an ineffi ciently low voter turnout. Information
acquisition has been studied in the Condorcet Jury literature by allowing voters to buy information
about the common feature of the alternatives (see Persico, 2004, Gerardi and Yariv, 2005).
The lobbying literature models a similar problem (see Austen-Smith and Wright, 1992, Baye,
Kovenock and de Vries, 1993, Che and Gale, 1998, 2006, Kaplan and Wettstein, 2006). The method
of reaching a group decision is by allowing would-be voters to send a signal of how much they care:
by lobbying. With this method, we would expect that voters with strong preferences or special
interest groups to have greater influence on the outcome than with voting. This is due to the
ability of voters with more extreme preferences to send a stronger signal. Such undue influence
is not necessarily harmful; lobbying may be welfare enhancing over voting since under voting the
outcome can be determined by a large number of voters that do not strongly care about the outcome
or vote without any information about the specific issues. In Chakravarty and Kaplan (2010), we
determine under which conditions, a purely wasteful signal (which we call shouting) will lead to a
more effi cient solution than voting. In Chakravarty and Kaplan (2013), for purely private goods,
we find the optimal allocation mechanism when only wasteful signals can be used and determine
under which conditions making use of these signals is useful. The environment also fits the classic
approach of using a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, but such a mechanism of allowing the rich
to directly buy the outcome that they desire could be considered morally repugnant (see Leider
and Roth, 2010).
In the next section, we examine our model when there is an equal number of voters supporting
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each option and the uncertainty in the model is in the strength of each voter’s support for the option.
Then in section 3, we analyze the case where, in addition to the uncertainty of the strength, there
is uncertainty as to which alternative a voter supports. In section 4, we consider the possibility
where each voter can have a random cost of voting. We conclude in section 5.
2 Aggregate Supporter Certainty
2.1 Model
Here we model a committee making a binary decision such as in which of two districts, A or
B, to build a casino. There are an equal number of representatives from each district, and each
representative has a private value for it being built in his district and a common cost for showing
up to vote. This cost is wasted, such as the time used to stand in the queue to vote or the monetary
transportation costs of going to the polling station. We call this the Aggregate Supporter Certainty
(ASC) model, since it is known how many potential voters support each option.
Formally, there are two types of voters and n voters of each type, so overall there are 2n voters.
Each voter has cost c ≥ 0. Assume that each voter i has a privately observed value vi ≥ 0 that
is independently drawn according to the non-atomic cumulative distribution F with support [0, v],
where v > 2c.11 We also assume that F ′(0) is finite. If 1 ≤ i ≤ n, voter i is a type A voter who
values a win by A at vi and a win by B at 0. If n + 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n, voter i is a type B voter who
values a win by B at vi and a win by A at 0. Choice A wins if the number of votes it receives,
denoted by #A, is strictly greater the number of votes choice B receives, denoted by #B. Choice
B wins if #B > #A. If there is a tie, #B = #A, then the winner is determined randomly with
equal probability of each winning.12
2.2 Equilibrium and social surplus
Denote v∗(c) as a cutoff strategy such that a voter i votes if his value is above v∗(c) and doesn’t
vote if his value is below v∗(c). For simplicity, we will sometimes write v∗ instead of v∗(c). While
we are implicitly looking at type-symmetric equilibria, for small values of c, all equilibria will be
11Without the assumption that v > 2c, there exists a trivial equilibrium where nobody votes.
12Note that the voter’s preference for platform A or B is modelled in the style of Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983,
1985).
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type symmetric (see Myerson, 1998, and Krishna and Morgan, 2015). We denote the derivative of
v∗(c) w.r.t. c as v∗c (c) or v
∗
c . Also, we denote Pr−i(event|v∗) as the probability that event occurs
given that all voters except voter i follows cutoff strategy v∗ and voter i does not vote.





Pr−i(#A = #B|v∗) +
1
2
Pr−i(#A = #B − 1|v∗)
]
> c.
The expression Pr−i(#A = #B|v∗) represents the case when all other votes are tied. Hence,
voter i is pivotal since by i voting, the outcome will change the vote from a tie to a win by voting.
The expression Pr−i(#A = #B − 1|v∗) represents the case when voter i will change the outcome of
a vote from losing to a tie. The gains in either instance is half the value, vi2 . In the following two
lemmas we describe the equilibrium and social surplus to voting. Note that all proofs are in the
Appendix.
































F (v∗)2n−a−b (1− F (v∗))a+b
 (n−max{a, b})E[v|v < v∗]+
max{a, b}E[v|v > v∗]
(2)
−2(1− F (v∗))n · c.
The expected value of the winner is computed by going through the possible number of voters
for each candidate where a is the votes for candidate A and b is the votes for candidate B. The
probability of each case is calculated and multiplied by the expected value of the winner, which is
calculated by the expected value of those that voted for the winner plus the expected value of those
that wanted the winner to win but nonetheless didn’t vote for him. The expression 2n(1−F (v∗))c
is the expected cost of the voters voting since 1−F (v∗) is the probability of each voter voting and
there are n voters of each type.
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2.3 When is it optimal to have a voting cost?
In the following proposition, we derive the conditions under which the optimal cost is strictly
positive.
Proposition 1 Under ASC, if E[v] · F ′(0) > 1, then the optimal cost is strictly positive.
The condition, E[v] ·F ′(0) > 1, has two components that depend upon the distribution of v: the
density at zero and the expected value. The combination of these two components must be large
enough. Too low a value of the density at zero would mean that increasing cost does not eliminate
enough low value votes. Too low an expected value would mean that the benefit to eliminating these
low-value voters is not large enough. This condition is equivalent to limc→0
dE[v|v>v∗(c)]
dc > 2. This
implies that the expected value of those voting is increasing in cost by a suffi cient amount, namely
2. In other words, if one increases cost marginally by a dollar (at zero), then the expected value
of those voting should go up by 2 in order for costly voting to be beneficial. This condition is also
equivalent to limṽ→0
dE[v|v>ṽ]
dṽ > 1. This states that the mean-residual-lifetime function (MRL) of F
is strictly increasing at zero. It is satisfied by all strict log-convexity distributions (see Proposition
2 of Heckman and Honore, 1990). Similar conditions (such as having a monotone MRL) are used
in a variety of economic applications (see Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005). These include McAfee
and Miller (2012) who show that an increasing MRL at zero implies allocating appointments (or
objects) by reservations is ineffi cient for low transportation costs.
The following example illustrates Proposition 1.
Example 1 F (v) = vα where α > 0, c < 1/2, n = 1.
We have limv→0 vF ′(v) = limv→0 αvα = 0. From (1), v∗(c) = 2c. We can then write equation
(2) as
(2c)2αE[v|v < 2c] + (1− (2c)2α)E[v|v > 2c]− 2(1− (2c)α)c
=
α− 2c(1 + α) + (2c)α(α+ 2c)
1 + α
.
The slope of the surplus w.r.t. c is
SSV ′(c) = −2 + 2




For α > 1 , limc→0 SSV ′(c) = −2. For α = 1, limc→0 SSV ′(c) = −1. For 0 < α < 1, limc→0 SSV ′(c) =
∞. Hence, when 0 < α < 1, the surplus improves by increasing the cost. When α ≥ 1, the surplus
is at the highest when cost is zero. (When α ≥ 1, SSV ′(c) is strictly increasing in c for all c > 0,
hence SSV ′(c) can equal zero only once. Since SSV (0) = SSV (1/2), no one votes in either case,
and SSV ′(0) < 0, the point at which SSV ′(c) = 0 must be a minimum.)
We also see that the conditions of Proposition 1 are satisfied for 1/2 ≤ α < 1, however,
limv→0 F ′(v)F (v) = 0 is not satisfied for 0 < α < 1/2. Thus, we demonstrate that Proposition 1’s
conditions are suffi cient but not necessary.
3 Aggregate supporter uncertainty.
3.1 Model and Initial Results
In the previous section, we assumed that there were an equal number of supporters for either A
or B. Here we assume there are n voters and each voter has an equal and independent chance of
desiring each outcome. This leads to aggregate supporter uncertainty (ASU). Again, each voter
has a level of support for his desired outcome drawn according to the non-atomic cumulative
distribution function F with support [0, v], where v > 2c and F ′(0) is finite. The voter preferences
over platforms is similar in style to that in Börgers (2000, 2004), we will discuss the differences
later.
In the following lemma, we show there is a unique equilibrium and determine its cutoffcondition.
























if a is odd.
= 2c. (3)
This leads to a similar condition to ASC on the expected value and density of the low types for
which the optimal cost of voting is positive.
Proposition 2 Under ASU, if n is even and E[v] · F ′(0) > 12 , then the optimal cost is strictly
positive.
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Notice that the condition with aggregate supporter uncertainty E[v] · F ′(0) > 12 and an even
number of voters is weaker than that when there is certainty E[v] · F ′(0) > 1 (which by our
assumptions also has an even number of total voters). Thus, for all distributions where it would be
worthwhile to have voting costs without uncertainty in number of supporters for each outcome, it
would also be worthwhile to have positive voting costs with such supporter uncertainty. We note
that we are unable to use our methods to find a result when n is odd.
3.2 What is the optimal level of voting?
We saw in the previous subsection that voting, even if it is costly, can have benefits to social surplus.
However, in the previous subsections, who voted was determined by equilibrium conditions. In this
subsection, we wish to ask what should be the correct level of voting for society. This is the
equivalent of asking if a social planner can decide a critical level of value only above which people
should vote, what should it be?
Finding this level allows us to compare the optimal level to the equilibrium level. We can then
ask what policy recommendations we can give to induce this level —having penalties for not voting
or adding a poll tax. These penalties and taxes are just transfers and thus do not affect overall
welfare.13 Remember, in contrast, a cost of voting yields no direct benefit to anyone and given
the same voting outcome is a waste to society. In the following proposition, we can compare the
equilibrium with the optimal level of voting.
Proposition 3 Under ASU, (i) there is an excess of voting, (ii) there should be no fines for failing
to vote (no mandatory voting), (iii) there should be a poll tax to discourage voting.
We can see the intuition of the Proposition by the following. A voter’s vote will be pivotal in
two instances. Case (A): when there is a tie in votes without his vote. Case (B): when the other
13Another method would be to employ some criteria for voting that reflects values. For instance, Jefferson felt
only the educated should vote (Padover 1952, page 43). In our model, they would have better information and hence
higher values for certain candidates. For instance, with the Brexit vote, some voters might be hurt by a Brexit but
not know it (such as seniors wanting to retire in Spain) or gain from a Brexit and not know it (such as workers in
uncompetitive industries). With lack of knowledge, these voters could have been close to indifferent to voting between
either option. When Brexit won the vote many voters claimed to have not been aware of all the consequences of the
vote and now felt strongly in favor of remain.
There have also been literacy and property ownership as requirements. While literacy might have been used to
disenfranchise certain minority groups, a property ownership requirement for the most part was to restrict voting to
groups that had a stake in the country (high values).
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candidate leads by 1 without his vote. In case (A), there will be no externality imposed since the
other voters balance each other out. For case (B), the net externality imposed by a voter on others
by voting is −E[v|v > v∗]. This externality is negative and a voter doesn’t take this into account.
Thus, in equilibrium there is a higher level of voting compared to the optimal level.
Börgers (2000, 2004) develops a model with costly voting and shows (in Börgers, 2004) that
the unique equilibrium is superior to both mandatory voting still with voting costs (or equivalently
bribing people to vote) and random choice (with no one voting). He also graphically shows (in
Börgers, 2000) that the unique equilibrium may be superior to one with lower voting costs, but
importantly did not show that it is superior to one with zero voting costs. With the technique used
in the above proposition, it becomes apparent that Börgers (2004) also has an excess of voting.14
The main difference of our model to that of Börgers (2000, 2004) is that we allow for different
intensities of preferences while Börgers (2000, 2004) has different voting costs. In both models, it
is always optimal to charge a poll tax when there is a positive cost of voting; however, only in our
model is it worthwhile to have a poll tax when the cost of voting is zero. This is because when
the marginal voter has a value of 0 and when pivotal (moving from a loss to a tie) is replacing a
voter with a higher value. In Börgers (2000, 2004), it is optimal to have all voters voting when
there is zero voting costs, since everyone has the same valuation (in absolute terms) and thus this
will maximize the information aggregated. Krasa and Polborn (2009) vary the Börgers model by
allowing for ex-ante asymmetry of preferences over alternatives. They find that for a large enough
number of voters, it is optimal to move towards mandatory voting from voluntary voting (by a
penalty for not voting or a subsidy to voting). There are no restrictions on F for a poll tax to be
optimal. The tax is a transfer unlike a wasteful cost of voting so is a superior alternative. It is not
clear that a poll tax is politically viable. This then leads to our previous sub-section where it may
be worthwhile to maintain (or even induce) a cost of voting. Doing so eliminates voters with little
intensity for their preferred candidate.
14The externality imposed on others by voting is absent in case (A) and equal to the value in case (B). For the
same reason as the proof of Proposition 2, there is an excess of voting in the Börgers model as well.
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4 Random Cost of Voting
In our two models, we have assumed that all voters have the same cost of voting. Imposing a cost
may not uniformly affect the voters. In this section, we assume that each voter in addition to their
privately known value will also have a privately known cost. It is conceivable that a designer may
have control over not only the cost but the type of cost.
For example, a government can make it diffi cult to obtain an absentee ballot which would lead
to a uniform cost of those expatriates trying to vote. Alternatively, the government could require
voters to fly back in order to vote, as is required in Israel. These latter costs could mirror random
costs since they would vary by the distance needed to travel. Similarly, a government could make
it diffi cult to register to vote in general for a uniform cost or, for random costs, make it diffi cult for
voters to change voting location and force them to return to their hometowns, as was in the case of
the abortion referendum in Ireland. Not having the polls open for very long without giving people
time off from work will make the cost of voting random. Finally, for voting in committees moving
to an app-based voting may impose a higher cost on those less technologically able.
We analyze the possibility that a designer can choose for voters to have a random cost of voting
according to the cumulative distribution G(c) in addition to their value drawn from the cumulative
F (v). Note that we are assuming that v and c are independent. There is an equilibrium v(c) where
a voter votes if v ≥ v(c) and does not vote if v < v(c). We further note that this v(c) must be
linear since a voter’s decision is voting if the probability of being pivotal times the benefit is larger
than the costs P (pivatol) · v/2 ≥ c. This requires v/c to be larger than a certain ratio. We are able
to show that replacing a random cost with a uniform cost that maintains the same proportion of
those who vote will inherently increase the expected value of those that vote. Since the winning
coalition has a disproportionately higher amount of voters, this will increase the expected value of
the winning coalition.
Proposition 4 For any interior cutoff equilibrium v(c) with costs distributed by G(c) and values
distributed by F (v), for the same value distribution, there exists an equilibrium with a higher expected
value of the winning option with uniform costs ĉ, where 1− F (v(ĉ)) =
∫ 1
0 (1− F (v(c)))dG.
Note that this analysis ignores the cost side of voting. If we look at the total surplus of voting,
then social surplus can decrease by replacing random costs with a uniform cost. This can happen if
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there is little variance in the value of voting. There could be an equilibrium where the cutoff cost to
voting in most cases is high but there is a significant chance of a low cost. In order to maintain the
same level of voting, it would be necessary to have a high uniform cost. For instance, say a voter
is always pivotal and the value of voting is approximately 2 and costs are randomly distributed
according to the uniform distribution on [0, 2]. In equilibrium, half the voters will vote and pay an
expected cost of 1/2. In order to maintain this with a uniform cost, the cost would have to be 1,
which is a worse outcome via social surplus.
While one cannot always improve surplus by replacing a random cost with a uniform cost while
maintaining the expected number of voters, we conjecture that there is always a surplus superior
equilibrium with a uniform cost and a higher number of voters. For instance in the above example,
a cost of voting of 0 would be superior.
We finally note that if the cost could be associated with preference intensity (as in Chakravarty
and Kaplan 2013), then following the intuition there, it is likely that a negative relationship could
improve welfare since it would be easier for those with high values to indicate their preference than
those with lower values.
5 Conclusion
Since the nineteenth century, political scientists have been in agreement that increasing the franchise
will be beneficial to the society (Lakeman and Lambert, 1959, page 19). So over the last century
in democracies, the right to vote has been given to most of the adult society and the requirements
of registration to vote such as property qualifications have been removed. Social scientists have
further asked the question whether or not it makes sense to require people to vote. In addition
this requirement to vote also gets around the paradox that since each individual may find his vote
negligible will choose not to vote if there is a cost to voting. We show that not only should one not
require people to vote but there is a distinct benefit to having some people not vote and increasing
the (wasteful) cost to voting may paradoxically be beneficial to society. (Note increasing a wasteful
cost of voting may be politically more viable than imposing a poll tax.) For instance, if a committee
has an important vote, scheduling the meeting at an inconvenient time may improve the outcome.
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This also shows that allowing absentee ballots or internet voting can be damaging.15
It may be possible that with repeated play (such as with committees) voters may voluntarily
withhold votes without cost to voting. However, Engelmann and Grimm (2012) experimentally find
that in a repeated game when preferences are privately known, without imposed budget constraints
on votes, voters will not cooperate and withhold votes (even with two players).16
There are many directions of future research where one can extend our results by expanding
the environment. One direction is to increase the number of alternatives on the ballot to more
than two. With committee voting this seems quite logical. Furthermore, once this is done, one can
introduce approval voting to ameliorate strategic voting (see Brams and Fishburn, 1978). Another
direction is to introduce a common value element in addition to a private value as in Osborne and
Turner (2010).
6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1





Pr−i(#A = #B|v∗) +
1
2
Pr−i(#A = #B − 1|v∗)
]
= c.
When the voter i prefers A (i ≤ n), we can rewrite the probabilities in this equation as follows:
Pr−i(#A = #B|v∗)











(1− F (v∗))2i F (v∗)2(n−i)−1
15 In Israel, absentee ballots are not allowed. Voters fly back to Israel specifically for the election (Los Angeles
Times, May 9, 1999). Our results show that this waste may actually be socially effi cient.
16Note that Kaplan and Ruffl e (2012) do find cooperation in a similar flavored repeated entry game, but have a
higher negative externality of entry than exists with voting.
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and
Pr−i(#A = #B − 1|v∗)











(1− F (v∗))2i+1 F (v∗)2(n−i−1) .























Since the equilibrium entails the probability of being pivotal equalling twice costs over benefits, the
above equation resembles the equilibrium condition in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, 1985). This



















The same equation holds for voters preferring B (i > n). 
Proof of Proposition 1
We proceed by establishing two properties of the equilibrium. (i) v∗(0) = 0. This follows
directly from equation (1): when there is a zero cost of voting, everyone votes. (ii) If n = 1 or
limv→0 vF ′(v) = 0, then limc→0 v∗c (c) = 2. To establish this observe that equation (1) must hold for
all c, so we can take the derivative w.r.t. c and take the limit as c→ 0. As c→ 0, we have v∗ → 0,
thus we can replace limc→0 with limv∗→0 . Hence, we have limc→0 1 − F = 1 and limc→0 F = 0.
Notice that from these limits, the only potential remaining term from the derivative of the LHS of
(1) is when i = n− 1. (For n > 1, the rest vanish.) This yields:
[
1− (n− 1) lim
v∗→0






Hence, v∗c (0) = 2 when n = 1 or limv→0 vF
′(v) = 0.
We can now prove the main result using these two properties. To show that the optimal cost
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is strictly positive, it is suffi cient to show that limc→0 SSV ′(c) > 0. We will prove this by showing
that the derivative of the expected value of the voters that prefer the winning candidate is higher
than the derivative of the expected costs.
By assumption, F (0) = 0 and F ′(0) is finite. Hence, (iii) limv→0 F ′(v)v = 0 and (iv) limv→0 F ′(v)F (v) =
0. Given (iii) and (iv), the derivative of SSV as c goes to 0 can be determined as follows. Using the
product rule, the derivative is equal to the sum of the values times the derivative of the probabilities
plus the sum of the probabilities times the derivative of the values. The probability of a voters








F (v∗)2n−a−b (1− F (v∗))a+b . (A2)
The limit of (A2) as c→ 0 is zero if a+ b < 2n and 1 if a+ b = 2n. If a+ b = 0, then the derivative
of (A2) is 2nF 2n−1F ′vc which goes to 0 since limv→0 F ′(v)F (v) = 0 and limc→0 v∗c = 2 by the above
limits. If a + b = 2n, the derivative is −2n (1− F )2n−1 F ′vc which goes to −2nF ′vc. Otherwise,








(2n− a− b)F (v∗)2n−a−b−1 (1− F (v∗))a+b − (a+ b)F (v∗)2n−a−b (1− F (v∗))a+b−1
]
F ′vc


















Let us now look at the sum of the values times the derivative of the probabilities. When
a+ b = n, we have (n−max{a, b})E[vi|vi < v∗] + max{a, b}E[vi|vi > v∗] = nE[vi|vi > v∗]. When
a+ b = 2n−1, we also have (n−max{a, b})E[vi|vi < v∗]+max{a, b}E[vi|vi > v∗] = nE[vi|vi > v∗].
Thus, when multiplied by the derivative of the probabilities and summed over the possible values
for a and b, the limit goes to 0.
We are left with the sum of the probabilities times the derivative of the values. As we saw
above, as c goes to 0 the only time the probabilities are non-zero is when a = b = n. Thus,
lim
c→0





4n · c · F ′(v∗).
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Since E[v|v > v∗] =
∫∞
v∗ vdF (v)




−v∗c · v∗F ′(v∗)








dc = limc→0 2F
′(v∗)
∫∞
0 vdF (v) = limc→0 2E[v]F
′(v∗). Thus, since E[v]F ′(0) >
1, SSV ′(0) > 0 and it is optimal to increase costs.
Note that even though there is a unique equilibrium at c = 0, when c > 0, there is a possibility
of multiple type-symmetric equilibria (see Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983, 1985). However, even if
this is the case, under these conditions we have shown that all of the type-symmetric equilibria
must yield higher social surplus than the equilibrium when c = 0. Since c is small, all equilibria
must be type symmetric (see Myerson, 1998, and Krishna and Morgan, 2015). 
Proof of Lemma 3
There are n voters overall. Take the decision of an individual voter. Consider each case where





F (v∗)n−1−a (1− F (v∗))a. If a is
even, this voter is pivotal only if there is a tie. This happens if exactly a/2 vote for each outcome,








. If a is odd then the voter is pivotal if there is exactly
one less voter that votes for his preferred outcome. This has (a− 1)/2 voting for his outcome and








. Using the above
forms equation (3). The LHS of (3) is 0 when v∗ = 0. The LHS equals v when v∗ = v which is
larger than 2c. Hence, since the LHS is continuous, there exists an interior solution to the equation.
Finally, we want to show uniqueness. The probability of being pivotal given that a other voters
vote is decreasing in a. As v∗ increases the distribution of the number of other voters stochastically
shifts downwards. Hence, as v∗ increases, the overall probability of being pivotal increases. Thus,
the LHS of (3) is strictly increasing in v∗ and we have a unique solution. 
Proof of Proposition 2
We begin by noticing that when there is a zero cost of voting, everyone votes, v∗(0) = 0.This
follows directly from equation (3).We now look at limc→0 v∗c (c). Take the total derivative w.r.t. c
of the cutoff equation (3). Since limv→0 F ′(v)v = 0, the only term remaining on the LHS is when
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a = n− 1. Thus,
lim
c→0



























if n is even.
.
For convenience, we look at the social surplus of the equilibrium above random allocation.
Doing so does not affect the analysis since we are taking the derivative. The social surplus of the
equilibrium (above random allocation) is the expected benefits (above random allocation) minus
the costs of voting. The expected benefits depends only upon the number of voters that vote (in
expectation all those that don’t vote have the same expectation as a random allocation). If two vote
for an option and two vote against it, the difference in surplus from random allocation is zero. If
three vote for an option and two vote against it, the difference in surplus is E[Vi|Vi > v∗]. In general,
the social surplus above random allocation is the number that voter for the winning option minus
the number that vote for the losing option times E[Vi|Vi > v∗]. Given there is an equal chance that
a voter that chooses to vote votes for either option, the number of votes for option A minus those
for option B follows a one-dimensional random walk as voters vote. The social surplus given that
a certain number of voters vote is the expected absolute value of this number times E[Vi|Vi > v∗].
If a voters vote, then this expectation is

(a−1)!!
(a−2)!! if a is even,
a!!
(a−1)!! if a is odd.
(see Weisstein, 2010). Note that
the double factorial, n!!, is either all strictly positive even numbers up to n multiplied together or
all strictly positive odd numbers up to n multiplied together depending upon whether n is even or








F (v∗(c))n−a (1− F (v∗(c)))a
E[v|v > v∗(c)] ·

(a−1)!!
(a−2)!! if a is even,
a!!
(a−1)!! if a is odd.

−(1− F (v∗(c)))n · c.
18
Taking the limit as c→ 0 of the derivative yields:
lim
c→0












(n−2)!! if n is even,
n!!
(n−1)!! if n is odd.
+nE[v|v > v∗(c)] · F ′(v∗(c))

(n−2)!!
(n−3)!! if n is odd,
(n−1)!!












′(0)E[v] limc→0 vc, thus limc→0
dE[v|v>v∗(c)]
dv∗ =
E[v] ·F ′(0). Also note that limc→0 F ′((v∗(c))) ·vc ·c = 0 if limv→0 F ′(v)v = 0 and vc is finite. Hence,













(n−3)!! if n is odd,
(n−1)!!




(n−2)!! if n is even,
n!!
(n−1)!! if n is odd.

−n.






′(0) − n =
2n · (n/2−1)!(n/2)!(n−1)! ·
(n−1)!!
(n−2)!! ·E[v]F
′(0)− n. Since 2n/2n! =
1
(n/2)!(n−1)!! and 2
n/2−1 (n/2− 1)! = (n− 2)!!,
we have limc→0 SSV ′(c) = (2E[v]F ′(0)− 1) · n. Now this is strictly greater than zero if and only if
E[v] · F ′(0) > 12 .










−n = −n. Now this is never greater than zero. Hence, in that case, using
this method we are unable to determine when it is optimal to have a positive cost when n is odd.

Proof of Proposition 3























(v∗ − E[v|v > v∗]) if a is odd.
= 2c.
(6)
From this equation, the equilibrium cutoff will then be lower than the optimal cutoff. To see
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this the LHS is similar to the LHS of equation (3) but (v∗ − E[v|v > v∗]) multiplied by one of the
probabilities instead of v∗, which is then smaller. Since the LHS of (3) is increasing in v∗. The LHS
of (3) will be smaller than 2c for all v∗ less than the equilibrium cutoff. Consequently, the LHS of
(6) is smaller than 2c for all v∗ less than the equilibrium cutoff. Hence, the solution to (6) must be
higher than the equilibrium cutoff. Since the optimal level of voting is lower than the equilibrium
level, a government could charge for voting in order to implement the optimal cutoff. This would be
change the c in equation (3) such that the v∗ that solves that the solution of equation (3) matches
the solution to the equation (6). Note that while (6) may have more than one solution, all solutions
would be at a higher v∗, then the equilibrium. Also, the only possible non-interior optimal cutoff
for c > 0 is where no one votes (it can never be socially optimal for a zero-valued voter to vote).
Thus again, the optimal cutoff would be higher than the equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 4









If we define ĉ such that 1− F (v(ĉ)) =.
∫ 1
0 (1− F (v(c)))dG.
We can then have a new regime were costs are uniform at ĉ, and voting occurs whenever v ≥ ĉ.
This insures that the probability of voting is the same in both regimes. Due to the mean value
theorem, ĉ exists. We will now show that the surplus is higher under a regime where there is a
uniform cost of ĉ. Let us start by looking at the expected value of those that vote. With random




v(c) vdFdG. Under fixed c, the expected value is G(ĉ)
∫ 1
v(c) vdF.









v(ĉ) vdFdG. By definition of 1− F (v(ĉ)), we have F (v(ĉ)) =
∫ 1
0 F (v(c))dG. Thus,
∫ ĉ
0
[F (v(ĉ))− F (v(c))]dG =
∫ 1
ĉ
[F (v(c))− F (v(ĉ))]dG.










Thus, the measure of values gained is the same as the measure of values lost. Also, since all values
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gained are above v(ĉ) and all values lost are below v(ĉ). In expectation E[v|v > v(ĉ)] > E[V |V >
v(c)]. The winners have proportionally more voters than the losers. Hence, keeping the proportion
of voters the same and increasing the expected value increases social surplus.
Denoting p as the probability of voting. With aggregate certainty, the expected number of those












p2n−a−b (1− p)a+b [max{a, b}]













p2n−a−b (1− p)a+b a.
By maintaining the same proportion of voters but shifting those that vote to have higher values.
Increasing E[v|vote], keeping p constant and holding pE[v|vote] + (1 − p)E[v|not vote] = E[v],
we increase the expected value of the winning coalition. While this last analysis is done for the
aggregate supporter certainty model, with similar reasoning it will hold for the aggregate supporter
uncertainty model. Namely, the winning coalition will have on average more voters than any
particular coalition. 
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